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I. INTRODUCTION
There exists much insightful commentary on the commercial speech doctrine.
Some of it debates whether the doctrine's underlying premises can be neatly
theorized' or whether a pragmatic approach is more germane.2 Other scholarship
considers the merits of particular applications; for example, whether specific
portions of the securities, 3 consumer protection,4 or food and drug 5 laws pass
*Associate Professor, University of San Francisco School of Law. I thank the editors of the South
Carolina Law Review for the opportunity to participate in the Law Review's Symposium, "Commercial
Speech in an Age of Emerging Technology and Corporate Scandal," in Columbia. South Carolina on
February 16, 2007.
1. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate Political Expenditures and
Redish's The Value of Free Speech. 130 U. PA. L. REV. 646, 658 (1982) [hereinafter Baker, Realizing
Self-Realization] (discussing the differences between his view and Redish's view in terms of two
theories); Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the
Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 473 (1971). For a summary of the debate
surrounding Grand Theory. see Edward J. Eberle, PracticalReason: The Commercial Speech Paradigm.
42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 411, 418-25 (1992). For a general overview of different theories of the
commercial speech doctrine, see Ronald A. Cass, Commercial Speech, Constitutionalism, Collective
Choice, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1317, 1322 51 (1988).
2. See, e.g., Eberle. supra note 1, at 429 (discussing the Middle Ground perspective on First
Amendment Theory): Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a
General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1212, 1283 (1983) ("Speech interacts with
the rest of our reality in too many complicated ways to allow the hope or the expectation that a single
vision or a single theory could explain, or dictate helpful conclusions in. the vast terrain of speech
regulation.") N at Stern. In Defense of the Imprecise Definition of Commercial Speech, 58 MD. L. REV.
55, 87 88 (1999) (rejecting the notions of"mechanical tests and rigid categorization" in the context of
corporate speech and the First Amendment).
3. For example, on the issue of investment advisory newsletters, see Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181.
203-11 (1985) (concluding a company's publications were "bona fide publications." rather than
"investment advisor" publications); Carol E. Garver, Note, Lowe v. SEC: The First Amendment Status
of Investment Advice Newsletters, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 1253, 1268 71 (1986) (describing how courts
treated investment publications before Lowe); David B. Levant. Comment. Financial Columnists as
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constitutional muster. Even defining commercial speech has spawned its own small
cottage industry.6
InvestmentAdvisers: After Lowe and Carpenter. 74 CAL. L. REV. 2061.2076-79 (1986) (discussing the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals's and Supreme Court's differing analyses of investment advisory
publications); John D. Norquist, Case Comment, SEC v. Lowe: The Constitutionality of Prohibiting
Publication ofInvestment Newsletters Under the Investment Advisers Act, 69 MINN. L. REV. 937, 953
(1985) ("Lowe represents an unwarranted expansion of the Supreme Court's commercial speech
doctrine."). For information on Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD), 17 C.F.R. 243.100, see SEC v. Siebel
Systems. Inc.. 384 F. Supp. 2d 694. 701-09 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (addressing a claim the SEC brought
alleging a company made nonpublic material statements in violation of Regulation FD): Antony Page
& Katy Yang, Controlling Corporate Speech: Is Regulation Fair Disclosure Unconstitutional?, 39 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1,33-66 (2005) (analyzing various SEC regulations in light of the First Amendment and
concluding Regulation FD is unconstitutional); Adam flumes, Note, SEC v. Siebel Systems, Inc.:
Comment on the SEC 's FailedEnforcement ofRegulation Fair Disclosure in Federal Court, 32 J. CORP.
L. 161. 163-66 (2006) (discussing the history and background of Regulation FD). For a discussion of
proxy solicitations, see Jill A. Hornstein, Note, Proxy Solicitation Redefined: The SEC Takes an
Incremental Step Toward Effective Corporate Governance. 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1129, 1143 47 (1993)
and Clark A. Remington. Note, A Political Speech Exception to the Regulation of Proxy Solicitations,
86 COLUM. L. REV. 1453. 1454-60 (1986). For a general discussion of issues various securities laws
have raised concerning the First Amendment and corporate speech, see generally Aleta G. Estreicher,
Securities Regulation and the First Amendment, 24 GA. L. REV. 223 (1990).
4. A prominent example is the commentary that has emerged about false advertising following
Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002), cert. granted, 537 U.S. 1099 (2003), cert. dismissed, 539
U.S. 654 (2003). See, e.g., James J. Barney, Note, The Mixed Message: The Supreme Court's Hissed
Opportunity to Address the Commercial State of Confused Speech in Nike, Inc. v. Kasky?. 37 UWLA
L. REV. 1 (2004): Ellen J. Pantaenius. Note, To Speak or Not to Speak: The Interplay Between Unfair
Trade Practice and Securities Laws Poses Challenges for Corporate Speech, 72 UMKC L. REV. 257
(2003); Michele Sutton, Note, Between a Rock and a Judicial Hard Place: Corporate Social
Responsibility Reporting and Potential Legal Liability Under Kasky v. Nike, 72 UMKC L. REV. 1159
(2004).
5. See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 360 (2002) (holding that section
127(a) of the Food and Drug Administration Act of 1997 was an "unconstitutional restriction[] on
commercial speech"); 1. Scott Bass et al.. Off-Label Promotion: Is FDA ' Final Guidance on Industry-
Supported Scientific and Educational Programs Enforceable?. 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 193, 201-12
(1998) (analyzing various First Amendment concerns regarding the FDA's policies on scientific and
educational programs).
6. The Supreme Court has at times used different definitions. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp.
v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557. 561 (1980) ("The Commission's order restricts only commercial
speech, that is, expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.");
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973) ("The
critical feature of the advertisement in Valentine v. Chrestensen was that, in the Court's view, it did no
more than propose a commercial transaction ..."). As Ronald Cass observes, "the Supreme Court has
struggled with the definition of commercial speech." Cass, supra note 1, at 1373. See also Henry N.
Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Corporate Governance Speech and the First Amendment, 43 U. KAN. L.
REV. 163. 167 (1994) ("in light of the inherent problems in distinguishing commercial and
noncommercial speech, it is not surprising that the Court has struggled with a definition."): Alan
Howard, The Constitutionality of Deceptive Speech Regulations: Replacing the Commercial Speech
Doctrine with a Tort-BasedRelational Framework, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1093, 1135 (1991) ('[T]he
first problem with the court's simplistic approach is the lack of a good definition of commercial
speech."): Stem, supra note 2, at 79-83 (discussing the various definitions of commercial speech the
Court has employed); William Warner Eldridge IV, Casenote, Just Do It: Kasky v. Nike, Inc. Illustrates
that It Is Time to Abandon the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 179, 181 83
(2003) ("Numerous United States Supreme Court decisions demonstrate that there has been difficulty
[Vol. 58:913
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This Article takes a different approach by discussing the political economy of
commercial speech. It asks whether the recent push toward broader protections for
commercial speech represents a very sophisticated attempt at putting forth a
deregulatory agenda through constitutional rhetoric a role similar to that which
the Due Process and Contract Clauses occupied nearly a century ago. To the extent
that an overly expansive commercial speech doctrine is used to discredit agency
regulation, it represents a brilliant attempt to sidestep the deference courts give
regulators under Chevron.
The argument is structured in two parts. Part 11 suggests that two movements,
the Chicago school and public choice, have given intellectual legitimacy to the push
for expanded commercial speech protections. Unfortunately, however, this agenda
is flawed along two major dimensions. First, it glibly conflates commercial speech
with core political speech, which is at the heart of the First Amendment. Second,
it suffers from a host of facile and untenable assumptions about rational consumers,
self-correcting markets, and good corporations versus bad governments. This
agenda attempts to use the First Amendment to sidestep economic regulation, much
like the Lochner era relied on Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claims.
Part III explores six curious anomalies that fuel the agenda described in Part II.
These represent leaps of logic that are made seemingly without
justification-puzzles that, conveniently enough, benefit those who wish to grant
ever-expansive rights to commercial speech. First, there is an inconsistent
willingness to attack certain regulatory regimes, but not others. Second,
corporations are simply assumed to have constitutional rights. Third, the rhetoric
bizarrely shifts attention away from speakers toward listeners and information.
Fourth, there is a permissive attitude toward mixing political with commercial
speech, thereby sidestepping even the minimal requirement that commercial speech
not be false or misleading. Fifth, there is an unwillingness to ask why a government
that can regulate an underlying commercial transaction might not be able to
regulate speech promoting that transaction. Finally, there is a strange desire to defer
to courts as frontline arbiters of economic policy, effectively sidestepping Chevron
deference.
11. A FLAWED AGENDA
Protection for commercial speech is a new phenomenon.8 Up until the United
in forming a bright-line test as to what constitutes commercial speech."). Even state courts have gotten
into the game. See, e.g.. Kasky. 45 P.3d at 256 (offering its own broad definition of commercial speech).
For a proposal building on California's definition of commercial speech in Kasky. see Tamara R. Piety.
Free Advertising: The Case for Public Relations as Commercial Speech, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
367, 371 (2006) ("1 argue here that the Court should clearly state that the term 'commercial speech'
broadly encompasses all speech that could be characterized as marketing or related to for-profit
corporate self-promotion.").
7. See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
8. See, e.g., Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41
HASTINGS L.J. 577, 611 (1990).
2007]
3
Dibadj: The Political Economy of Commercial Speech
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
States Supreme Court's 1976 landmark decision in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,9 commercial speech
received no constitutional protection.' 0 Decisions since Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy suggest that, if anything, protections of corporate speech are getting
stronger.1" Large commercial interests that benefit from expansive commercial
speech rights have fueled this trend,"2 as have think tanks sympathetic to their
cause.
13
More important for our purposes, however, is to recognize that both the
Chicago and public choice schools have provided the intellectual foundations of
this movement. In a rare article written in 1964, one of the Chicago school's
leaders, Aaron Director, claimed "a remarkable similarity between the underlying
basis for complete laissez faire in the market for ideas and the market for economic
goods and services.' 4 A decade later, Ronald Coase argued similarly: "I do not
believe that this distinction between the market for goods and the market for ideas
is valid. There is no fundamental difference between these two markets [for goods
and for ideas] . '. ..""Obliterating the difference, of course, inexorably leads to the
conclusion that commercial speech be afforded the same level of constitutional
9. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
10. See, e.g.. CentralHudson. 447 U.S. at 584 (Rehnquist, J.. dissenting) ("Prior to this Court's
recent decision in [Virginia State Board of Pharmacy], however, commercial speech was afforded no
protection under the First Amendment whatsoever." (citation omitted)); Donald E. Lively, Securities
Regulation andFreedom of the Press: Toward a Marketplace ofldeas in the Marketplace ofInvestment.
60 WASH. L. REV. 843. 845-46 (1985) ("Until the mid-1970's. commercial speech was considered
beyond the purview of the first amendment."); Stern, supra note 2. at 56 ("In 1976, the Supreme Court
formally abandoned its longstanding position that commercial speech categorically falls outside the
realm of First Amendment protection."). The canonical pre- 1976 case is Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316
U.S. 52 (1942). in which the Court declared "that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on
government as respects purely commercial advertising." Id. at 54. For a brief history of the commercial
speech doctrine, see Remington, supra note 3, at 1456 57.
11. See, e.g., Rodney A. Smolla. Afterword, Free the Fortune 500! The Debate over Corporate
Speech and the First Amendment, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1277, 1292 (2004) ("While nominally the
Supreme Court continues to apply the intermediate scrutiny standard of Central Hudson, examination
of the actual case decisions demonstrates that the trajectory of modern commercial speech law has been
an accelerating rise of protection for advertising.").
12. See, e.g., Tamara R. Piety, Grounding Nike: Exposing Nike s Questfor a Constitutional Right
to Lie, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 151. 158 (2005) [hereinafter Piety. Grounding Nike] (observing how a
company such as Nike has been able "to cast itself as a victim and draw parallels between its claims and
those made by the defendants in New York Times, without inspiring hoots of derision"); David G.
Yosifon, Resisting Deep Capture: The Commercial Speech Doctrine and Junk-Food Advertising to
Children, 39 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 507, 598 (2006) (noting the existence of "[c]orporate deep capture
campaigns, replete with astro-turf organizing, [and] the maintenance of front groups").
13. For example, "the Liberty Fund, Inc. sponsored a conference on 'The First Amendment and
Federal Securities Regulation.' ... held at George Mason University School of Law." Henry N. Butler.
The First Amendment and Federal Securities Regulation, 20 CONN. L. REv. 261, 262 (1988).
14. Aaron Director, The Parity of the Economic Market Place, 7 J. L. & ECON. 1, 3 (1964).
15. R. H. Coase, The Economics of the First Amendment: The Market for Goods and the Market
for ideas, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 384,389 (1974). As is typical with Coase, however, he carefully qualifies
his statements: "It may not be sensible to have the same legal arrangements governing the supply of
soap, housing, automobiles, oil, and books. My argument is that we should use the same approach for
all markets when deciding on public policy." Id.
[Vol. 58:913
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protection as political speech.16
In a similar, although distinct vein, public choice theorists have built on George
Stigler's seminal argument that government regulators are "captured" by private
interests.17 Fred McChesney, for example, argues against allowing the government
to cabin commercial speech on the theory that "concern for public values like truth
has less to do with governmental restrictions on speech than does bestowal of
benefits on private interests."' 8 More recently, well-known commentators such as
Alex Kozinski, Henry Butler, and Larry Ribstein have argued for abolishing the
distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech.19 Though not couched
directly in the language of the Chicago school or public choice theory, this
contemporary work reaches the same conclusions.
Although superficially seductive, these analyses are unfortunately flawed along
two major dimensions: they too easily conflate political speech with commercial
speech and are based on facile assumptions. The first weakness is the most intuitive
and the simplest. Theorists have too easily tried to elevate commercial speech to the
level of political, artistic, or scientific speech at the core of the First Amendment.
Commercial speech, however, is different. As Lillian BeVier notes, it does not even
appear within our constitutional framework:
Political speech can find its source of protection in the
Constitution's establishment of representative democracy, a form
of government unthinkable without free discussion and debate
about political issues. First amendment protection of political
speech is thus legitimate because it is securely anchored in the
Constitution itself. Commercial speech can find no such comfort.
One might define commercial speech narrowly, to encompass
merely product or service advertising, which only facilitates
economic transactions. Or one might define it more
broadly . . . . The scope of the definition does not affect the
conclusion about whether the Constitution should protect it,
because the view that an intention to withdraw the power to make
16. There is little doubt that both Director and Coase recognized that "[a]t bottom, the doctrine
of commercial speech rests on a clean distinction between the market for ideas and the market for goods
and services." Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due
Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REv. 1. 2 (1979).
17. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SC.
3 (1971).
18. Fred S. McChesney. A Positive Regulatory Theory of the FirstAmendment. 20 CONN. L. REv.
355, 358 (1988). McChesney claims that "exclusion of commercial speech from full constitutional
protection can be explained in terms of an interest-group model." Id. at 365. For a discussion of the
public choice approach in the context of commercial speech, see Cass, supra note 1, at 1362.
19. See, e.g.. Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?. 76 VA. L.
REv. 627, 628 (1990) ("It is the thesis of this Article that the commercial/noncommercial distinction
makes no sense."); Butler & Ribstein, supra note 6, at 172 ("[P]olitical speech cannot be clearly
distinguished from commercial speech."); Eldridge, supra note 6, at 208 ("Commercial speech should
be held to the same level of protection as noncommercial speech.").
2007]
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rules regarding economic transactions from the political branches
can be found within the text, history and structure of the
Constitution is an untenable one. Thus, if the text, history, and
structure of the Constitution are the criteria of value, commercial
speech would not be entitled to constitutional protection.20
In fact, one might even go a step further to argue that commercial speech is
antithetical to the essence of the First Amendment:
There are deeper reasons for the commercial/noncommercial
distinction. These go to the values being formed, encouraged and
supported by the speech. The Bill of Rights was framed
fundamentally to carve out a sphere of individual liberty so that
citizens could better achieve dignity, autonomy and equality. The
First Amendment plays a leading role in sustaining and promoting
these human values. But these human values are threatened by the
American commercial market structure. Commercial America
tends to promote a system of values at odds with those enshrined
in the Bill of Rights. These commercial values include
materialism, exploitation, hedonism and superficiality. Americans
are urged to define themselves in terms of what they own or
produce, not by who they are or would like to become.2
If anything then, one might argue that commercial speech protections should be cut
back, not expanded.
To be sure, distinguished commentators will disagree, arguing, for example,
that "commercial speech aids in the attainment of society's goal of intellectual self-
fulfillment and ... helps the individual to rationally plan his life to achieve the
maximum satisfaction possible within the reach of his resources., 22 A cynic might
be forgiven, however, for questioning the argument that "self-realization through
commerce can lead to enhanced self-realization generally. '23 After all, as
proponents of commercial speech themselves admit, "political speech does not ask
hearers to enter into an exchange of money for goods, as does a commercial
,,24 tatransaction,' not to mention that "one searches in vain for an indication from any
of the people involved with the drafting or ratifying of the first amendment that
20. Lillian R. BeVier, A Comment on Professor WolJfon 's The First Amendment and the SEC.'
20 CONN. L. REV. 325, 327 (1988) (footnote omitted).
21. Eberle, supra note 1, at 466 (footnotes omitted).
22. Redish. supra note 1, at 472; see also Kozinski & Banner. supra note 19. at 652 ("Yet, in a
free market economy, the ability to give and receive information about commercial matters may be as
important, sometimes more important, than expression of political, artistic, or religious nature.").
23. Eberle, supra note 1, at 449.
24. McChesney. supra note 18, at 365.
[Vol. 58:913
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they were concerned with anything besides politically oriented speech. 21
At its core, commercial speech is about facilitating a monetary transaction, not
serious political, artistic, or scientific discourse.26 Justice Rehnquist observed the
following, with some humor, in his dissent in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy:
It is undoubtedly arguable that many people in the country regard
the choice of shampoo as just as important as who may be elected
to local, state, or national political office, but that does not
automatically bring information about competing shampoos
within the protection of the First Amendment. It is one thing to
say that the line between strictly ideological and political
commentaries and other kinds of commentary is difficult to draw,
and that the mere fact that the former may have in it an element
of commercialism does not strip it of First Amendment protection.
But it is another thing to say that because that line is difficult to
draw, we will stand at the other end of the spectrum and reject out
of hand the observation of so dedicated a champion of the First
Amendment as Mr. Justice Black that the protections of that
Amendment do not apply to a "'merchant' who goes from door to
door 'selling pots.'"
2 7
Or, as Justice White succinctly stated, "[W]hat some have considered to be the
principal function of the First Amendment, the use of communication as a means
of self-expression, self-realization, and self-fulfillment, is not at all furthered by
corporate speech."2
A second, more technical, flaw relates to a spate of facile economic
assumptions implicit in the Chicago school and public choice ideologies. I have
detailed these troubling fallacies elsewhere.29 Suffice it here to outline a few
problems inherent in the laissez-faire enterprise that are particularly relevant to
commercial speech. The first is the implicit beliefthat consumers magically process
25. Kozinski & Banner, supra note 19, at 632. The authors seek to rebut this argument simply by
noting that "[a] myopic originalist view of freedom of speech does not get us very far." Id. at 633.
26. As Ed Baker observes, "the first amendment should not protect speech rooted in the dictates
of the marketplace because the profit motive acts as an alien determinant of speech, thereby breaking
the connection between speech and human choice." C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem
in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REv. 1, 25 (1976) [hereinafter Baker, Commercial Speech].
27. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 787 88 (1976)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 650 (1951) (Black, J.,
dissenting)); see also Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350. 404 (1977) (Rehnquist. J., dissenting)
(refusing to extend First Amendment protection to "advertisements of goods and services").
28. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 804-05 (1978) (White, J., dissenting);
see also Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 16, at 14 ("Measured in terms of traditional first amendment
principles, commercial speech is remarkable for its insignificance. It neither contributes to self-
government nor nurtures the realization of the individual personality.") Cass R. Sunstein. Half-Truths
of the First Amendment, 1993 U. CH. LEGAL F. 25, 30 (1993) ("In the commercial speech cases.., we
are dealing with low-value speech, and the risk of illegitimate motivation is small.").
29. See REZA R. DIBADJ, RESCUING REGULATION 43 65 (2006).
2007]
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information as rational utility maximizers. As one scholar observes, "[t]he
commercial speech doctrine thus reflects and entrenches a highly dispositionist
conception of human agency. The core of the Court's jurisprudence in this area
revolves around a stylized picture of a rational actor accumulating information, the
better to make consumption decisions that are in her own best interest.,
30
Unfortunately for this perspective, behavioral economics has shown that these easy
assumptions are too often wrong. 1
Another false assumption is that of the self-correcting market. As one
commentator notes, "Advocates of laissez-faire will rue the day when it becomes
widely understood that what is thought to be a free market actually requires
extensive and constant government support.
32 Simply put, markets need rules. 33
This is especially true where the resources are so imbalanced:
[T]he promoters of the materialist message benefit from an almost
classic case of market failure. Advertisers spend some sixty
billion dollars per year to disseminate their messages. Those who
would oppose the materialist message must combat forces that
have a massive economic advantage. Any confidence that we will
know what is truth by seeing what emerges from such combat is
ill placed. The inequality of inputs is structurally based. 4
The usual argument that speech should be countered with more speech becomes
farcical in this context.
Instead ofmaking facile assumptions around putatively rational consumers and
self-policing markets, a return to the first principles of economics would be far
more illuminating. As Russell Korobkin and Thomas Ulen succinctly note, "[t]he
seminal insight that economics provides to the analysis of law is that people
respond to incentives ... ,,35 Proper incentive-based economic analysis thus might
reach precisely the opposite result that facile laissez-faire theories would suggest.
Lillian BeVier observes the following in the context of the need for securities
30. Yosifon, supra note 12, at 559: cf Bates, 433 U.S. at 375 ("If the naivet6 of the public will
cause advertising by attorneys to be misleading, then it is the bar's role to assure that the populace is
sufficiently informed as to enable it to place advertising in its proper perspective."); Va. State Bd of
Pharmacy. 425 U.S. at 765 ("Advertising. however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is
nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling what product. for what
reason, and at what price.").
31. See DIBADJ, supra note 29, at 73 79.
32. Allen D. Boyer. Free Speech, Free Markets, and Foolish Consistency. 92 COLUM. L. REV.
474, 487 n.51 (1992) (reviewing NICHOLAS WOLFSON, CORPORATE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND
THE SEC (1990)).
33. See Michael P. Dooley, The First Amendment and the SEC: A Comment, 20 CONN. L. REV.
335, 342 (1988) ("The government's case that the disclosure requirements reduce information costs and
thus enhance the efficiency of the capital markets is very strong.").
34. Shiffrin, supra note 2, at 1281 (footnote omitted).
35. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumptionfrom Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1054 (2000).
[Vol. 58:913
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regulation:
One way to understand at least certain kinds of rules that protect
political speech is to view them as means by which the law shores
up what are otherwise rather fragile incentives to produce and
disseminate information about government and public officials.
Similarly, a way to understand the lack of constitutional
protection for producers of information about securities is in
terms of the fact that the market for such information already
creates and sustains adequate incentives for producers and
disseminators. 6
As such, "[c]onstitutional protection is required for producers of information about
politics and politicians, then, not so much because society values it more than
commercial speech or speech about securities but because consumers value it
less.' 7 Strong First Amendment protection for political speech can thus be
conceptualized as a "constitutional subsidy',38 that commercial speech should not
receive.
Beyond improper application of economic concepts, those espousing strong
commercial speech protections are enamored of a simple and dangerous dichotomy:
private corporations, good; governments, bad. Henry Butler and Larry Ribstein, for
instance, contend that "government regulators are more likely to commit costly
errors regarding restrictions on commercial speech than are private market
forces,, 39 because "[i]f speech is truly robust, then the market itself should be able
to correct errors."4 ° Another commentator worries about "official mischief,",
4
1
conveniently leaving the analysis of"private mischief" as an exercise for the reader.
One of the Chicago school's intellectual giants, Milton Friedman, claims that "[t]he
preservation of freedom is the protective reason for limiting and decentralizing
government power., 42 Yet what about the "freedom" of a citizen not to have to
withstand a barrage of commercial speech, such as manipulative advertising?
43
These arguments are simplistic and one-sided. Ronald Cass aptly observes:
The public choice argument can be taken to mean that all or
virtually all decisions of government will be social-welfare
reducing. It is difficult to accept this argument as a complete
36. BeVier, supra note 20, at 329.
37. Id. at 330-31.
38. Id. at 328.
39. Butler & Ribstein, supra note 6, at 183.
40. Id. at 181.
41. Lively, supra note 10. at 871.
42. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 3 (1962).
43. See Mayer, supra note 8, at 614 ("[T]he assertion of corporate commercial speech rights
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description of democratic-republican collective choice: the
opportunity for political entrepreneurship, for one thing, admits
an avenue for welfare-enhancing social choice. Other forces as
well doubtless constrain the relentless march toward a
government completely given over to distribution of private
benefits at public expense.44
Why should society fear the motives of government more than those of private
corporations? Whose interests should each have at heart? Most disturbingly, the
notion that "government should not be able to regulate .... propagates a facile
cynicism about the structures that define society. 45 Put bluntly, "[m]arketplace
theory does not rest on confidence in the market; it rests on distrust of
government."46
This rhetorically brilliant, yet flawed, agenda might be usefully discussed as
an attempt to resurrect economic due process through the First Amendment. The
crucial point to recognize here is that those who would like expansive protections
for commercial speech recognize that "economic rights can be closely aligned with
the traditional rights protected by the First Amendment."47 This is a clever
rhetorical argument replete with broader ramifications:
In a society that has become suspicious of politics and a legal
culture that tends to view political struggle as simply an
unprincipled, unprofessional and sloppy version of courtroom
procedure, the First Amendment principle of abstention has
expanded beyond a program of making politics safe to become a
primary vehicle in a post-New Deal attempt to reduce the scope
of conscious collective control over the market. The First
Amendment, understood in this way as a fundamental limitation
on the scope of government, has become the locus of a new
Lochnerism-or rather, a revival of the old Lochnerism under a
new doctrinal label. The courts have increasingly begun to use the
First Amendment to restrict economic regulation and enforce a
vision of the market freed not from politics "gone bad," but rather
from all politics altogether.48
44. Cass, supra note 1, at 1363 (footnotes omitted).
45. Boyer, supra note 32. at 496.
46. Shiffrin, supra note 2. at 1273.
47. Page & Yang, supra note 3, at 34.
48. Daniel J.H. Greenwood, FirstAmendment Imperialism, 1999 UTAH L. REv. 659, 661 (1999);
see also Boyer, supra note 32. at 477 ("An expansive definition of commercial free speech, however.
could frustrate legitimate regulation as thoroughly as liberty-of-contract jurisprudence undermined
reform legislation at the turn of the century .. "); Dooley, supra note 33, at 353 ("It may be that the
commercial speech doctrine represents an attempt by the Court to recapture some of the judicial
authority it lost when it abandoned substantive due process.").
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Justice Rehnquist recognized this crucial point in his dissent in CentralHudson Gas
& Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,49 in which he warned that the
majority "has also, by labeling economic regulation of business conduct as a
restraint on 'free speech,' gone far to resurrect the discredited doctrine of cases such
as Lochner and Tyson & Brother v. Banton."5
It is particularly revealing that scholars who believe in elevating commercial
speech to the level of political speech do not like government regulation." For
example, Nicholas Wolfson claims that "regulation almost always restrains the free
choice of groups and individuals. Therefore, it is hardly obvious that product ad
regulation will invariably, or even usually, benefit the consumer or the public." 2
As Frederick Schauer reminds us, "economic libertarians now ... gravitate to the
First Amendment rather than to the Due Process or Contracts Clauses .... They
have identified and seized upon the First Amendment's rhetorical place in
American political and legal argument, and have sought, hardly irrationally, to use
this phenomenon in support of their causes. 5 3 As a result, "objections to
government regulation of business that were originally based on concern for
economic liberty have become objections to the regulation of commercial
49. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
50. Id. at 591 (Rehnquist. J.. dissenting) (citing Tyson & Brother-United Theatre Ticket Offices,
Inc., v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 444-45 (1927)); see also Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 16, at 30
("Instead, economic due process is resurrected, clothed in the ill-fitting garb of the first amendment, and
sent forth to battle the kind of special interest legislation that the Court has tolerated for more than forty
years."); Remington. supra note 3. at 1462 ("Giving all [commercial communications] full protection
would invalidate much regulation of commercial communication and substantiate the worst fears of
those who warn that the new commercial speech doctrine is nothing more than a metamorphosis of
Lochner v. New York.").
51. See, e.g.. Butler & Ribstein, supra note 6. at 206 ("Constitutional constraints on mandatory
federal regulation would free the capital markets of unnecessary regulation and improve the resource-
allocation function of these markets.").
52. Nicholas Wolfson, The First Amendment and the SEC, 20 CONN. L. REV. 265, 275 (1988).
However, Michael Dooley suggests the following in his critique of Wolfson's thesis:
Wolfson's view of the first amendment is sweeping indeed, for it sweeps away not
only the federal securities laws, but large portions of the United States Code, the
Code of Federal Regulations and the statute books of all fifty states, the District
of Columbia. Puerto Rico, and the various territories subject to United States
jurisdiction.
Dooley, supra note 33, at 336 37; cf Piety, Grounding Nike, supra note 12, at 161 ("The ascendancy
of the 'corporate free speech' argument is of concern because, if arguments such as Nike's win support,
they will provide a basis for undermining much of the government's power to regulate business
effectively in a myriad of contexts .... "); Michael R. Siebecker, Corporate Speech, Securities
Regulation, and an Institutional Approach to the First Amendment, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 613,627
(2006) ("When laws place civil or criminal penalties on certain instances of commercial speech.
companies have a strong incentive to escape the ambit of those regulations by claiming political
protection under the First Amendment.").
53. Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of
Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1809 (2004) (footnote omitted); see also Burt
Neuborne, The First Amendment and Government Regulation of Capital Markets. 55 BROOK. L. REV.
5, 8 (1989) (noting an argument for importing First Amendment protection "wholesale into the
economic speech area as a potent weapon in the deregulation of the economy"). Citations to 55
Brooklyn Law Review refer to page numbers as indicated on original printed pages.
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advertising. ' ' 4
Well-known commentators pushing for expansive commercial speech rights
understand this point well. Fred McChesney admits that "[w]hat constitutional
lawyers call the 'commercial speech doctrine' is a form of what economists and
other lawyers call 'regulation.', 5 5 Kozinski and Banner tellingly warn that "[t]he
more things we find to be commercial speech, the more expression we can suppress
under the cover of economic regulation., 56 The flawed agenda, then, might really
be about deregulating the economy: it is perhaps no coincidence that commercial
speech protections were invented in the 1970s, as the deregulatory movement was
gaining traction.57 Regardless of where one stands on the regulatory debate,
however, "[o]ne needn't hold any particular hierarchy of values to think that the
free speech clause is one of the oddest places the framers could have chosen to
constrain governmental abridgement of economic liberty. 5 8
Finally, it is important to observe how the agenda to broaden commercial
speech becomes particularly important in a post-industrial economy focused on
knowledge. Expansive commercial speech rights allow corporations to control the
dissemination of information 59  arguably the most important commodity in a post-
industrial economy. As Carl Mayer aptly notes, "it is suggested that Modern
Property includes the intangible currency of the Post-Industrialist society:
knowledge and information. Information in all its forms including its use to
influence public elections and referenda is central to the modern political
economy. The defense of this Modern Property is an increasingly urgent corporate
concern."
60
54. Schauer, supra note 53, at 1794. Justice Rehnquist has recognized this point in his various
dissents to majority opinions granting expansive commercial speech rights. See, e.g.. Central Hudson,
447 U.S. at 584 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("I also think that the Court errs here in failing to recognize
that the state law is most accurately viewed as an economic regulation ...."); Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748.784 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.. dissenting)
("[T]here is certainly nothing in the United States Constitution which requires the Virginia Legislature
to hew to the teachings of Adam Smith in its legislative decisions regulating the pharmacy profession.").
55. McChesney, supra note 18, at 357.
56. Kozinski & Banner, supra note 19. at 649-50: see also Butler, supra note 13, at 263
(discussing Wolfson's argument that speech regulation can proscribe protected speech).
57. See John Henry Brebbia, First Amendment Rights and the Corporation, PUB. REL. J., Dec.
1979, at 16, 20 ("The Chrestensen decision [1942] was rendered during the Roosevelt age when the
concept of economic regulation was in full bloom, and the Virginia State Board [1976] and Bates
[1977] cases were decided in the age of deregulation.").
58. Dooley, supra note 33, at 338; see also Greenwood, supra note 48, at 664-65 (noting
numerous economic matters impacted by the First Amendment's Speech Clause).
59. Indeed, the Supreme Court has justified expansive commercial speech rights based on the
notion that society "may have a strong interest in the free flow of commercial information." Va. State
Bd of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 764; see also Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 ("The First Amendment's
concern for commercial speech is based on the informational function of advertising.").
60. Mayer. supra note 8. at 604 (footnotes omitted). "The importance of commercial speech in
the modem political economy is evinced by corporations' legal actions and by the business press'
defense of this form of communication." Id. at 611; Eberle, supra note 1, at 448 ("Even though prosaic,
commercial speech is nonetheless important because it involves the dissemination of information
concerning products and services in our vast market economy where information is among the most
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111. ANOMALIES
This part explores six anomalies integral to the agenda described in Part 11.
First, there is a desire to displace certain regulatory regimes, but not others. In
particular, regimes that might constrain corporations consumer protection,
securities regulation, food and drug law, and the like-are attacked."l Intellectual
property, by contrast a regulatory regime that helps corporations, is immune. As
Tamara Piety wryly notes in the context of the Nike, Inc. v. Kasky 2 controversy,
"[i]t seems beyond dispute that Nike's commitment to a multitude of tongues and
open debate does not extend to appropriation of the 'swoosh.' 6 3 To boot, courts
have generally tended to defer to the existence of a comprehensive regulatory
64regime, making the argument that the First Amendment should displace only
certain regulatory structures particularly odd.
Second, courts have implicitly given corporations constitutional rights. The
history of this sweeping grant is entirely unsatisfactory and dates back to two
sentences preceding a Supreme Court opinion from 1886, which simply state, "The
court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the provision in the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution ... applies to these corporations. We
are all of [the] opinion that it does. 65 Perhaps the Court did not wish to hear
argument on this issue because granting corporations such rights rests on dubious
grounds.6 First, and most simply, corporations are artificial creatures of the state
valuable of resources.").
61. See supra notes 3-5: see also Butler & Ribstein, supra note 6. at 194-205 (questioning the
constitutionality of various securities regulations and antitrust laws as applied to commercial speech).
62. 539 U.S. 654 (2003).
63. Piety. GroundingNike, supra note 12, at 199: see also id. at 19 ("Even more problematic.
given that the subject matter is almost wholly comprised of speech or expressive content, is trademark
law, including passing off and unfair competition generally, and copyright law.").
64. See, e.g., Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 584 (Rehnquist, J.. dissenting) ("1 disagree with the
Court's conclusion that the speech of a state-created monopoly, which is the subject of a comprehensive
regulatory scheme, is entitled to protection under the First Amendment."); Page & Yang, supra note
3, at 40-4 1 ("However, in heavily regulated industries such as the legal profession, fruit growing, and
gambling, courts hesitate to strike down regulations affecting speech because of the government's vast
authority to regulate these businesses." (footnotes omitted)): Stem, supra note 2, at 112 (noting the
Court had not applied "commercial speech doctrine" to regulatory schemes); cf Verizon Commc'ns,
Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398,412(2004) ("One factor of particular importance
is the existence of a regulatory structure designed to deter and remedy anticompetitive harm. Where
such a structure exists, the additional benefit to competition provided by antitrust enforcement will tend
to be small .... ). On the intersection of regulatory regimes with the First Amendment, see generally
Schauer, supra note 53, at 1178 82.
65. Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R. Co.. 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886) (statement of facts). As
Justice Rehnquist noted, "[t]he Court decided at an early date, with neither argument nor discussion,
that a business corporation is a 'person' entitled to the protection of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 822 (1978) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) (citing Santa Clara County. 118 U.S. at 396): see also Mayer, supra note 8. at 645-46
(noting several dissenting opinions of various members of the court that "publicly call into question the
legitimacy of the court to create a new class of constitutionally protected actors").
66. Cf. Brebbia, supra note 57, at 18 ("Generations of constitutional scholars and Supreme Court
Justices have argued that corporations. having no human nature, have no human rights.").
2007]
13
Dibadj: The Political Economy of Commercial Speech
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
and only exist at the whim of the state. The state has already given them
"superhuman" powers, such as limited liability and perpetual life.67 Justice White
made similar observations in his First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti dissent:
Corporations are artificial entities created by law for the purpose
of furthering certain economic goals. In order to facilitate the
achievement of such ends, special rules relating to such matters
as limited liability, perpetual life, and the accumulation,
distribution, and taxation of assets are normally applied to them.
States have provided corporations with such attributes in order to
increase their economic viability and thus strengthen the economy
generally. It has long been recognized, however, that the special
status of corporations has placed them in a position to control vast
amounts of economic power which may, if not regulated,
dominate not only the economy but also the very heart of our
democracy, the electoral process."
It would defy logic to argue that the state creating this artificial entity cannot
regulate its speech.
Another, more subtle, point is that while a firm is owned by shareholders, these
owners have little, if any, power in determining what the corporation says.
Managers make these decisions.6 9 Corporations even indirectly force shareholders
to contribute to speech with which they might not agree. Indeed, as Justice White
noted, managers should not be able to "use corporate monies to promote what does
not further corporate affairs but what in the last analysis are the purely personal
views of the management, individually or as a group.""7 Perhaps most dangerous
67. Carl Mayer notes the supervening irony:
The corporate drive for constitutional parity with "real" humans comes at a
time when legislatures are awarding these artificial persons superhuman
privileges. Besides perpetual life, corporations enjoy limited liability for industrial
accidents such as nuclear power disasters, and the use of voluntary bankruptcy
and other means to dodge financial obligations while remaining in business.
Mayer, supra note 8, at 658 59.
68. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, at 809 (White, J., dissenting); see also id. at 825 26 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the nature and source of the rights of corporations and concluding they do not
need First Amendment protections to carry out their commercial purposes).
69. See, e.g., Estreicher, supra note 3, at 275 76 ("Nevertheless, corporations are not natural
beings; when a corporation 'speaks' it speaks through the voice of its officers and directors, who are
agents exercising derivative power on behalf of their widely dispersed shareholder-principals."); Mayer.
supra note 8, at 656 ("Another broad objection to granting corporations Bill ofRights protections is that
to do so unfairly promotes the power of corporate managers while diminishing that of shareholders,
workers, and communities.").
70. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 813 (White. J., dissenting): see also Baker. Realizing Self-Realization.
supra note 1, at 676 ("[D]emocratic theory still would not justify granting corporate executives
discretionary control over the massive corporate resources, which were gathered for commercial
purposes, in order to pursue their political objectives."); cf. Brebbia, supra note 57, at 18 ("In addition
to the fear that big money will buy disproportionate political influence, a second justification voiced
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of all, there is little opportunity to debate these issues. As Carl Mayer observes,
Behind doctrines of commercial property and the free market
of ideas is hidden the tacit acceptance of the corporation as a
person, entitled to all the rights of real humans. Under this
methodology of constitutional operationalism, the rationale for
equating corporations and persons is not stated specifically,
however, so it cannot be rebutted. There is no opportunity for
denial; sub silentio the corporation is legitimated as a
constitutional actor.7'
The implicit assumption that First Amendment protections should extend to
artificial state creations cannot simply be swept under the rug.72
Notwithstanding this leap of logic, perhaps corporations are not entirely
sympathetic enough as constitutional actors. To sidestep this problem, a third
anomaly emerges: a shift in attention from the rights of the speaker qua speaker to
those of the listener. It is essential here to note a subtle, but very important,
rhetorical shift in the Court's reasoning where it has sought to expand commercial
speech rights. Perhaps nowhere is this more apparent than in Bellotti in which the
majority brilliantly managed to reconfigure the terms of the debate by stating that
"[t]he proper question therefore is not whether corporations 'have' First
Amendment rights and, if so, whether they are coextensive with those of natural
persons. Instead, the question must be whether [the statute] abridges expression
that the First Amendment was meant to protect. '73 Similarly, in Central Hudson,
the Court seemingly casually stated that "[c]ommercial expression not only serves
the economic interest of the speaker, but also assists consumers and furthers the
societal interest in the fullest possible dissemination of information.",74 As a result,
the Court is shifting attention away from the rights of an artificial, putatively profit-
seeking entity, toward those of a much more sympathetic class the audience.
75
Needless to say, this shift conveniently benefits those who desire expansive
commercial speech protections. Burt Neuborne offers a reminder:
for the ban on corporate political spending was the protection of shareholders from forced contributions
to candidates other than those they voluntarily supported.").
71. Mayer, supra note 8. at 650 (emphasis added).
72. Mayer, for example, argues that "a constitutional amendment is needed that declares
corporations are not persons and that they are only entitled to statutory protection conferred by
legislatures and referendums." Id. at 660.
73. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776 (emphasis added).
74. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 62 (1980); see
also Va. State Bd. ofPharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976) ("But
where a speaker exists, as is the case here, the protection afforded is to the communication, to its source
and to its recipients both." (footnote omitted)).
75. See Mayer, supra note 8, at 633 ("[T]he question became not whether the party asserting the
right (a corporation) was entitled to free speech protections, but whether assertion of the right furthered
free and open debate.").
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By liberating first amendment theory from its dependence on a
speaker-centered model, the Court made possible the protection
of speech, even when no toleration based speaker exists, by
permitting nonqualifying speakers to borrow the interests of other
participants in the speech process as a matter ofjus tertii and to
use those borrowed interests to trump attempts to censor the
speech.76
Perhaps it is no coincidence that distinguished commentators pushing commercial
speech similarly deflect attention away from the speaker. Much like the majority
in Bellotti, Kozinski and Banner claim that "[t]he commercial speech distinction
cannot turn on the profit motive of the speaker; the labeling of speech as
commercial has to be the result of an examination of the speech itself, not the
speaker's purpose."7  And Nicholas Wolfson argues that "at the very least,
whatever commercial speech may be, it cannot turn on economic self-interest or
commercial greed."" Unfortunately, though, it is disingenuous to confound the
property rights of corporations with the free speech rights of citizens.7 9
A fourth concern is the permissive attitude toward mixing political with
commercial speech, thereby occasionally sidestepping even the minimal
requirement that commercial speech not be false or misleading. Recall that under
the first prong of the canonical Central Hudson test, commercial speech cannot be
false or misleading to enjoy constitutional protection."0 Political speech, however,
does not face this requirement for it to receive First Amendment protection. In his
dissent to the denial of the writ of certiorari inNike, Inc. v. Kasky,8 l Justice Breyer
noted this difference:
The Court, however, has added, in commercial speech cases, that
the First Amendment "'embraces at the least the liberty to discuss
publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern."' And in
76. Neuborne, supra note 53, at 26.
77. Kozinski & Banner, supra note 19, at 640.
78. Wolfson. supra note 52. at 277: see also Barney, supra note 4. at 27 ("Instead of focusing in
on the speaker as the current commercial speech matrix does, a new approach should be developed that
solely examines the content of the speech to determine the dominant feature of the speech."); Cynthia
A. Caillavet, Comment, From Nike v. Kasky to Martha Stewart: First Amendment Protection for
Corporate Speakers'Denials of Public Criminal Allegations. 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1033,
1053 (2004) ("Though counter-intuitive, not every statement by a commercial speaker is commercial
speech for the purpose of First Amendment analysis. Rather, commercial speech is defined solely by
its content." (footnote omitted)).
79. See Baker, Commercial Speech. supra note 26, at 56 ("This suggests an obvious basis for
distinguishing personal rights from property rights.").
80. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) ("At
the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For
commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be
misleading."); see also Smolla, supra note 11, at 1278 ("False statements are not protected under the
reigning commercial speech standard established in [Central Hudson].").
81. 539 U.S. 654 (2003).
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other contexts the Court has held that speech on matters of public
concern needs "'breathing space' -- potentially incorporating
certain false or misleading speech-in order to survive. This case
requires us to reconcile these potentially conflicting principles.82
Given this uncertainty, it behooves commercial interests to mix ostensibly political
commentary with even false or misleading commercial speech and hope courts will
ignore the first prong of Central Hudson.8 3 Perhaps the most prominent
contemporary example occurred in Nike, Inc. v. Kasky where "Nike argued that it
could not be held liable under a California consumer fraud statute for any
potentially false or misleading statements made to the press about its overseas labor
policies, because those statements were part of an ongoing public debate about
international labor practices."84 But the danger is much broader:
The richness and complexity of the content of regulated
speech and the multiplicity of contexts in which deceptive speech
is used and regulated in our society quickly stretch the simplistic
Commercial Speech Doctrine to its breaking point. Consider a
cigarette manufacturer that disputes scientific claims about
tobacco or attempts to air more innocuous advertisements; an
organization created by the insurance industry that takes out ads
blaming high insurance premiums on a "litigation crisis"; an
investment broker who discusses an investment; a birth control
manufacturer that promotes family planning; a politician who
intentionally lies about his or her voting record to raise more
campaign funds; a lawyer who attempts to solicit or advise clients
to challenge a law; and an oil company that criticizes federal
international policy. Should the first amendment analysis of
speech regulation begin and end by questioning whether the
speech "does 'no more than propose a commercial
82. Id. at 676 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also Barney, supra note 4, at 20.
83. See, e.g.. Siebecker, supra note 52. at 662 ("[C]ompanies will face a strong incentive to
engage in an artful alchemy of mixing any potentially fraudulent disclosures withjust enough political
content to evade liability. The facility with which companies could engage in that artful alchemy should
cause great alarm."); Smolla, supra note 11, at 1287 ("In the context of corporate speech, the 'matters
of public concern' standard will tend to work to the benefit of corporations."); Barney, supra note 4.
at 20 ("The intermediate scrutiny of the Central Hudson and Bolger line of cases permitting the Court
to restrict mixed speech, conflicts with the First National Bank and Virginia Board of Pharmacy line
that provides First Amendment protections to speech of corporations when the speech touches on
matters of public concern.").
84. Siebecker, supra note 52, at 617: see also Piety, GroundingNike, supra note 12, at 177-78
(concluding that "Nike was asking for a constitutional shield for intentional misrepresentations");
Barney, supra note 4, at 29 ("Nike vs. Kasky was essentially a case predominantly about the treatment
of false or misleading speech rather than political speech or even commercial speech.").
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transaction' ,?15
This problem is not new, having echoes in cases such as Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Products Corp.86 and Valentine v. Chrestensen8 and being recognized by early
commentators on commercial speech.8" But it will likely assume greater importance
as corporations increasingly append political speech to commercial messages in an
effort to achieve First Amendment protections for false or misleading statements.89
The fifth and penultimate anomaly constitutes an unwillingness to ask why a
government that can regulate an underlying commercial transaction should not be
able to regulate speech promoting the same commercial transaction. The
conventional wisdom is that the power to regulate the greater (conduct) does not
include the power to regulate the lesser (speech).9° The Supreme Court's earlier
decisions in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations9'
and Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico 92 suggest,
however, that the ability to regulate an underlying economic activity includes the
power to regulate speech associated with the activity. To the extent that 44
85. Howard, supra note 6, at 1095; cf Bass et al., supra note 5, at 194 ("[T]he [FDA] guidance
regulates First Amendment-protected expression; that the speech at issue involves the exchange of
truthful scientific information (not commercial speech), which is entitled to the strongest First
Amendment protections .... ); Caillavet, supra note 78, at 1035 ("[T]his Comment concludes that a
corporate entity should not be subject to liability stemming from the denial of public allegations of
criminal wrongdoing. even if the denial is false or misleading.").
86. 463 U.S. 60.66 (1983) ("Youngs' informational pamnphlets, however, cannot be characterized
merely as proposals to engage in commercial transactions. Their proper classification as commercial
or noncommercial speech thus presents a closer question.").
87. 316 U.S. 52, 55 (1942) ("If that evasion [printing a political protest on the reverse side of an
advertising leaflet] were successful, every merchant who desires to broadcast advertising leaflets in the
streets need only append a civic appeal, or a moral platitude, to achieve immunity from the law's
command.").
88. Tellingly, in 1964 the Chicago school's Aaron Director wrote that "economic affairs are
increasingly converted into political discussion and decision." Director, supra note 14, at 7: see also
Baker, Commercial Speech, supra note 26, at 34-40 (discussing the various pecuniary and self-
interested motivations for commercial speech); Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 16, at 23 (lamenting "the
assumed propensity of affected parties to try to evade legal restraints on commercial speech by clothing
their business messages in political commentary or social debate").
89. See Siebecker, supra note 52, at 621 ("The incompatibility between the Supreme Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence regarding commercial speech and corporate political speech is becoming
increasingly apparent. The basic problem lies in a renewed effort by corporations to mix commercial
and political speech in their public statements.").
90. See, e.g., Estreicher, supra note 3, at 242 43 ("Since economic activity is almost universally
regulable, this rationale would render vulnerable to proscription virtually all commercial advertising,
including any truthful advertising seeking to promote activity lacking affirmative constitutional
protection.").
91. 413 U.S. 376, 389 (1973) ("Any First Amendment interest which might be served by
advertising an ordinary commercial proposal and which might arguably outweigh the governmental
interest supporting the regulation is altogether absent when the commercial activity itself is illegal and
the restriction on advertising is incidental to a valid limitation on economic activity.").
92. 478 U.S. 328, 346 (1986) ("[I]t is precisely because the government could have enacted a
wholesale prohibition of the underlying conduct that it is permissible for the government to take the less
intrusive step of allowing the conduct, but reducing the demand through restrictions on advertising.").
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Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Islandf3 overrules this precedent, it offers little
justification, contenting itself with the vague generalization that "banning speech
may sometimes prove far more intrusive than banning conduct. 94
The greater-lesser debate, at the very least, presents "an elegant question of
constitutional law."9' More likely, however, it is difficult to justify why the state
should not have the power to also regulate the lesser. As Ronald Cass reminds us,
"[r]estraints on speech promoting a commercial activity constitute a useful
intermediate step between inaction and restriction of the activity itself. We should
not readily conclude that this step, often the only politically feasible avenue
available, is constitutionally proscribed." 96 This reasoning is especially apt in the
context of commercial speech, which, as Daniel Farber observes, "is more akin to
conduct than are other forms of speech. The unique aspect of commercial speech
is that it is a prelude to, and therefore becomes integrated into, a contract, the
essence of which is the presence of a promise." 97 More broadly, as Farber
succinctly notes, "First amendment theories based on the distinction between
speech and conduct have never been very successful."" Perhaps we should stop
pretending that these theories are successful and, in the process, stop unnecessarily
restricting the government's ability to regulate.
The sixth and final anomaly is both simple and pervasive. It is the attempt to
make courts frontline arbiters of economic policy. More specifically, trying to
undermine limitations that the political branches, notably administrative agencies,99
place on commercial speech may be conceptualized as a technique to circumvent
93. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
94. Id. at 511 (Stevens. J.. plurality).
95. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 359 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1415, 1419 (1989) ("The central challenge for a
theory of unconstitutional conditions is to explain why conditions on government benefits that
'indirectly' pressure preferred liberties should be as suspect as 'direct' burdens on those same
rights....").
96. Cass, supra note 1, at 1380. Cass is also careful to add the following:
The common rejoinder is that the Constitution limits the government to fighting
bad speech with good speech. This is not an accurate statement of the history of
the first amendment or of its judicial interpretation. Both recognize that on
occasion speech generates harm that can be prevented more efficiently by
deterring the harmful speech than by subsidizing contrapuntal speech.
Id. at 1380 n.255 (citation omitted): see also Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 16. at 34 (arguing the
government has the power to ban speech where the government also has the power to ban the
underlying economic activity).
97. Daniel A. Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory. 74 Nw. U. L. REV. 372,
389 (1979); see also id. at 407-08 ("Most traditional consumer protection legislation is based on the
contractual nature of the speech. Misrepresentation, duress, overreaching, and unconscionability are
well-known contract doctrines. When the state attacks these problems with modem regulatory tools, it
can legitimately claim an interest quite distinct from the suppression of free expression."); cf Jackson
& Jeffries, supra note 16, at 35-36 ("[T]he significance of ordinary business advertising lies entirely
in its relation to the contemplated economic transaction.").
98. Farber, supra note 97, at 406.
99. See Stem. supra note 2, at 85-86.
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Chevron deference.0 0 Perhaps symptomatic ofthej udiciary's unease in filling such
a role, the commercial speech landscape is littered with examples of constitutional
avoidance at the Supreme Court, 10 ' appellate court, °2 and district court levels. °3
This avoidance makes our current state of affairs particularly unsatisfying.' 4
100. Cf Arthur R. Pinto, The Nature of the Capital Markets Allows a Greater Role for the
Government, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 77, 87 (1989) ("Although protection of the first amendment seems to
be established in the commercial speech area, there should be concern that the courts will become active
participants in overseeing each and every regulation involving economic speech.").
10 1. See, e.g., Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 655 (2003) ("The writ of certiorari is dismissed
as improvidently granted."); Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181,211 (1985) ("We therefore conclude that
petitioners' publications fall within the statutory exclusion for bona fide publications and that none of
the petitioners is an 'investment adviser' as defined in the Act."). Some Justices have explicitly noted
this avoidance. See, e.g., Nike, 539 U.S. at 663 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("The third reason why I
believe this Court has appropriately decided to dismiss the writ as improvidently granted centers around
the importance of the difficult First Amendment questions raised in this case."); Lowe. 472 U.S. at
227-28 (White. J.. concurring) (chastising the majority for avoiding the question of "whether the First
Amendment permits the Federal Government so to prohibit petitioner's publication of investment
advice.") For discussion of the Supreme Court's constitutional avoidance in commercial speech cases,
see, for example. Lively, supra note 10. at 843 ("Because securities regulation implicates protected
expression. and its specific constitutional parameters have not been officially charted, it is disappointing
that the Supreme Court bypassed a recent first amendment challenge ...."); Wolfson, supra note 52,
at 265 (noting the Court's decision in Lowe rested on "statutory interpretation, not constitutional
construction"); Levant. supra note 3, at 2094 ("The Lowe majority did not directly confront the first
amendment issue ....").
102. See, e.g., Long Island Lighting Co. v. Barbash, 779 F.2d 793, 796 (2d Cir. 1985) (declining
to address whether the First Amendment protected the activities of the defendants in the context of
proxy solicitations).
103. See, e.g.. SEC v. Siebel Sys.. Inc., 384 F. Supp 2d 694. 709 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("[T]his
Court declines to opine on the constitutional challenges raised."); see also Page & Yang, supra note 3,
at24 25 (describing a district court's decision as "classic constitutional avoidance" (internal quotations
marks omitted)); Humes, supra note 3, at 177 (noting that future constitutional challenges would arise
in regard to the "SEC's statutory authority to regulate").
104. Cf Dooley, supra note 33, at 340 ("The commercial speech doctrine raises some very
troublesome questions concerning the appropriate scope ofjudicial review, which the Supreme Court
has thus far avoided.").
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IV. CONCLUSION
The commercial speech doctrine is a confusing area ofFirst Amendment law.' °5
This Article has sought to take a step back from its murky intricacies to argue that
increased protections for commercial speech can be understood as an attempt to put
forward a deregulatory agenda that circumvents Chevron. But this strategy runs far
deeper than commercial speech or even the First Amendment. It runs to the Bill of
Rights more broadly. Carl Mayer chronicles how corporations have asserted the Bill
of Rights:
[C]orporations and their managers.., successfully have used the
Bill of Rights as a shield against government regulation.
Businesses now wield the Bill of Rights in much the same way
that the fourteenth amendment was used during the Progressive
era when corporations impeded state governmental regulation
with constitutional roadblocks. In this sense, the supposedly
defunct doctrine of substantive due process under which the
Court imposes its own economic views to strike down
regulation-retains surprising vitality. Indeed, the current era can
be categorized as one of corporate due process. °6
Discussion can only begin if citizens are made aware of what is really going on.
The time has come to expose the strategy and debate whether corporations should
benefit from constitutional protections designed to protect individual liberties from
majoritarian impulses. The commercial speech doctrine would be a good place to
begin.
105. Kozinski and Banner observe the inconsistencies:
Thus, government cannot prohibit certain sorts of commercial billboards, but can
prohibit the unauthorized use of certain words altogether. Government cannot
prohibit the mailing of unsolicited contraceptive advertisements, but can prohibit
advertisements for casino gambling. Government cannot require professional
fundraisers to obtain licenses, but can prohibit college students from holding
Tupperware parties in their dormitories.
Kozinski & Banner, supra note 19, at 631 (footnotes omitted); see also Baker, Commercial Speech,
supra note 26, at 1 ("The commercial speech exception has continually eluded theoretical justification.
as well as precise definition." (footnotes omitted)) Stem. supra note 2, at 142 ("The Court's ongoing
delineation of a sphere of commercial speech continues to navigate between criticism of its imprecision
and calls to abolish the concept altogether.").
106. Mayer. supra note 8. at 577-78 (footnote omitted). Use of constitutional arguments to attack
the regulation of corporations extends even beyond the Bill of Rights. See, e.g.. Kenneth W. Starr, A
Verdict on Sarbanes-Oxley: Unconstitutional, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16-17, 2006. at All (arguing that the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, established under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, violates the
Appointments Clause and constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power).
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